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TITLE:  CONTINUITY IN TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: A POLITICAL 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL FILM EXHIBITION 
 
MAJOR PROFESSOR:  Dr. Eileen Meehan 
 
This thesis analyzes the current transition to digital cinema projection 
technologies within the film exhibition business.  I begin by discussing two historical 
cases of technological change in film exhibition technology, and I identify the 
corporations that successfully controlled periods of technological change in order to 
solidify their position atop the film industry.  In drawing from these historical case 
studies, I examine the current transition to digital cinema projection technologies by 
discussing the structure of the film exhibition business and identifying those exhibitors 
that are controlling the transition to digital cinema.  I find that the top three exhibitors – 
Regal Cinemas, AMC Entertainment, and Cinemark – are controlling digital cinema 
through two joint ventures: Digital Cinema Implementation Partners (DCIP), and 
National CineMedia (NCM). 
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CHAPTER 1 
TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DIGITAL FILM EXHIBITION 
The transition to digital cinema is underway along with the accompanying rhetoric 
proclaiming the arrival of a unique film-viewing experience.  This transition has been a 
slow process due to unresolved issues relating to technical standards, adequate security 
measures, and a lack of funding for the implementation of digital cinema systems (Culkin 
and Randle, 2003; McQuire, 2004).  With these issues sufficiently addressed, theaters in 
the United States and around the world have begun installing digital projectors in 
preparation for the exhibition of digital content.  This thesis investigates the transition to 
digital cinema by focusing on the political economy of technological change.  In other 
words, I focus on the industrial implications of technological change, which focuses on 
the ownership structures within the film exhibition business and identifies the individuals, 
corporations, and associations holding the largest financial stake in the transition to 
digital cinema.  I begin by explaining the relevance of this topic of study and providing 
additional information regarding my rationale for pursuing this topic, including a review 
of the relevant literature.  These considerations lead to a series of questions that guided 
my research process.  I then explain the specific methods employed in conducting my 
research.  Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the findings as well as possible 
scenarios for the future of film exhibition.    
Film exhibition has been a largely overlooked area within film studies, but a small 
and growing corpus of scholarship is taking note of the importance that exhibition has 
played throughout film history (Acland, 2003; Waller, 1995; Gomery, 1992; Musser, 
1991).  Acland (2008) refers to this emerging sub-field as “exhibition studies,” which 
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seeks to “document the historical making and remaking of cinema’s exhibition contexts” 
(88).  This study contributes to exhibition studies by contextualizing the current transition 
to digital cinema within the history of technological change in the film exhibition 
business.  Previous studies dealing with the industrial history of film exhibition have 
focused on the managerial decisions, diffusion of innovations, and technological changes 
that have shaped the industry (Gomery, 1992).  However, rather than privileging 
technology as the primary factor accounting for change, I examine the power relations 
that constitute a broader structural context within which technological change is possible.  
In doing so, my approach resists technological determinism in order to identify the 
political, economic, and legal frameworks that enabled technological transitions.   
Technology may be understood as dialectically situated between democracy and 
capital.  When used for democratic purposes, technology interconnects citizens from 
around the globe for purposes of organizing political action, facilitating dialogue, or 
enabling cultural exchanges.  In order to be used for purposes such as these, technology 
must be participatory.  That is, citizens must have the ability to access the technology and 
be able to use it to connect with others.  On the other hand, technology may be controlled 
by capital, particularly within an industrial context, in order to extract greater surplus 
value from commodities by supplanting labor processes or eliminating spatial and 
temporal barriers that impede the rapid circulation of commodities (Braverman, 1974).  
Therefore, technology needs to be viewed as a complex phenomenon that interacts with 
the economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres of life.  However, the technological 
changes discussed here occur within the industrial context of the United States film 
industry and have been carefully orchestrated by certain key corporations for the 
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maximization of profit.  Although the historical context within which each technological 
change takes place may vary, the process of corporate control remains consistent.  
Therefore, technological change in an industrial setting is always controlled by capital 
and used for the maximization of profit, regardless of the aesthetic novelties promised by 
each technological change. 
Indeed, film history is often defined in terms of technological change: silent films 
were followed by sound films, which eventually added color, surround sound, computer-
generated imagery, etc.  Such a neat chronological history of film technology suggests 
that changes in technology were rational and inevitable.  However, the adoption of a new 
technology rarely occurs because of technological sophistication, but rather as a result of 
a broader set of existing power relations among institutions (Wasko, 1994).  Corporations 
secure patents for inventions, granting them a limited monopoly for the commercial 
exploitation of the technology.  Then, corporations defend their monopoly and stifle 
competition by securing patents for hundreds of possible variations on the technology 
(Noble, 1977).  In doing so, the corporation is able to license a technology for widespread 
industry adoption, thereby maximizing profit while individual inventors become reliant 
on corporations for the development of their ideas.  Therefore, technological change in 
any industry needs to be viewed as a carefully calculated and highly controlled 
undertaking within an economic, political, and legal framework that allows for 
commercial exploitation.  To this end, I demonstrate how two previous changes in film 
technology illustrate this tendency.  Specifically, I focus on the advent and adoption of a 
standardized film projection system and the implementation of a standardized sound 
format for film exhibition. 
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CHAPTER 2  
FILM EXHIBITION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Technological change is rarely an inevitable development within an industrial 
context (Gomery, 2005).  Rather, technological change is driven by profit motives 
inherent in capitalist industrial enterprise.  Accordingly, I demonstrate how film 
exhibitors have sought to capitalize on new technologies throughout the history of the 
film industry.  Specifically, I explain how film projection technology was successfully 
controlled by Thomas Edison and the Edison Manufacturing Company.  Similarly, the 
advent and adoption of sound technology was controlled by Western Electric, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of American Telephone and Telegraphy (AT&T).  In each case, 
corporations were able to secure the necessary patents for each technology, which 
allowed for the commercial exploitation and widespread adoption of those technologies.  
Furthermore, each corporation acted within the economic and political structure of the 
time and was supported, for a time, by the law.  As we will see, Edison’s Motion Picture 
Patents Company was eventually dissolved in 1918 after the U.S. government filed an 
antitrust suit against the company (Conant, 1960).  I will begin with a discussion of early 
projection systems, and then I will focus on the inclusion of sound in film exhibition. 
The history of film projection technology offers an excellent case study for the 
link between aesthetics and economics.  The development of film projection technology 
in the United States is tied to Thomas Alva Edison’s development of the phonograph.  By 
using the profits he had earned from the development of the phonograph, Edison sought a 
way to add a visual element to his phonograph, which led to the development of the 
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Kinetoscope (Richardson, 1967).1  The Kinetoscope was developed in 1891 by W.K.L. 
Dickson while working at Edison’s research laboratory.  The device was patented in 1893 
and was designed to exhibit an approximately 30 second motion picture to a single 
viewer, who activated the machine by depositing a nickel in the machine.2  Within a year 
of its development, the first Kinetoscope parlor was opened in New York City in 1894, 
which featured five Kinetoscopes showing different motion pictures to customers.  Soon 
thereafter, Kinetoscopes were installed in parlors, hotels, and storefronts in cities around 
the United States (MacGowan, 1954).  In this sense, the Kinetoscope provided the 
impetus for the formation of a motion picture industry, but the single-viewer restriction of 
the device was antithetical to a form of mass entertainment.  In order to reach a mass 
audience, motion pictures would need to be projected onto a screen. 
The idea of projecting motion picture images on a screen was not new in 1894 but 
the technology was yet to be developed.  After witnessing Edison’s Kinetoscope on 
display in Paris (Neale, 1985), Auguste and Louis Lumière were the first to actually 
develop a motion picture projector.  The Lumière brothers gave a public demonstration of 
their Cinématographe machine in 1895, which successfully projected moving images onto 
a screen.  The device solved the single-viewer limitation of Edison’s Kinetoscope by 
allowing for multiple viewers to enjoy a projected image.  Although Edison noted in his 
Kinetoscope patent that the device could possibly be a projector, he had not seen the 
                                                 
1
 Edison’s Kinetoscope was just one of many devices developed to showcase motion pictures. I have 
focused on Edison’s device primarily because of its role in providing a foundation for the motion picture 
industry in the United States. 
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benefit of developing such a device (MacGowan, 1954).  However, within a year of the 
Lumiere brothers’ exhibition of their projector, Edison gave a public exhibition of the 
Vitascope, which was developed by Thomas Armat and C. Francis Jenkins.  The two 
inventors had originally called their projector the “Phantoscope,” but the name of the 
device changed to “Edison’s Vitascope” when production rights were granted to Edison.  
This capitalized on the widespread recognition of Edison’s name as well as the patents 
Edison had pending on the film stock to be used in the machine via an exclusive 
agreement with Eastman Kodak.3  Thus, Thomas Armat successfully developed the 
motion picture projector and licensed his projector to Thomas Edison, which provided the 
impetus for creating a form of mass entertainment based on the exhibition of motion 
pictures.  During the years leading up to the turn of the century, rival firms and inventors 
sought to capitalize on the burgeoning motion picture industry by producing films in 
violation of Edison’s patents and by importing cameras from Europe where Edison’s 
patents were not valid.  Between the years 1898-1902, Edison defended his position by 
engaging in patent litigation that either put rivals out of business or forced them to abide 
by his terms (Musser, 1991).   
In the years that followed, Edison was embroiled in patent litigations to maintain 
his monopolistic position over the motion picture industry.  As Edison focused his energy 
                                                                                                                                                 
2
 Originally, viewers paid $0.25 to an attendant to activate the motion picture, but Edison was able to cut 
labor costs by installing the nickel-in-the-slot function. 
3
 This information was taken from an autobiographical essay written by Thomas Armat in 1935.  The article 
can be found in Fielding, Raymond (ed.). (1967). A Technological History of Motion Pictures and 
Television.  Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 
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on battling other firms for control of the industry, the demand for film continued to grow 
and hundreds of independent firms began producing motion pictures.  During the early 
years of the twentieth century, the creation of a film production company was still 
relatively easy as it did not require extensive amounts of capital.  Consequently, this time 
period was marked by open competition in which hundreds of independent firms worked 
against Edison and other large firms for control of the burgeoning motion picture 
industry.  Since Edison’s attention was primarily focused on obtaining patents for his film 
cameras, he was not actively engaged in competing with the smaller independent firms.  
However, once Edison’s patents were recognized by the courts, Edison used his patents to 
bring lawsuits against the independent firms for patent infringement.  To effectively 
dominate the industry and eliminate the hundreds of independent companies, Edison 
allied with the seven largest American film production firms, two French producers, and 
the leading American importer-distributor of films to form the Motion Picture Patents 
Company (MPPCo) in 1908, which pooled all members’ patents together for tighter 
control over the industry.4  All members of the MPPCo acknowledged Edison’s patents 
and agreed to work exclusively with those firms that had received licenses from the 
MPPCo.  By controlling the industry in this way, Edison and the other top firms could 
structure the industry according to their terms and create barriers that would inhibit 
smaller firms from entering the business.  Starting in 1909, the MPPCo used its patents 
and patent litigation to block entry of independent exhibitors into the industry and to 
                                                 
4
 The MPPCo members included The Edison Company, The American Mutoscope and Biograph Company, 
The American Vitagraph Company, The Essanay Film Manufacturing Company, The Selig Polyscope 
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force non-MPPCo film companies out of the industry.  Responding to this, the industry 
the United States government filed an antitrust lawsuit against the company in 1912, 
alleging that the MPPCo had “engaged in unreasonable restraint of trade and (had) 
monopolized commerce in films, cameras, projectors, and accessories” (Conant, 1960, 
20).  The MPPCo abandoned these practices in 1914, but was finally dissolved in 1918.   
This brief overview of motion picture projection technology illustrates three very 
important points.  First, the history of motion picture projection illustrates the importance 
of controlling new technologies by using the legal apparatus, specifically by securing 
patents on technological devices.  Second, we have seen how patent litigation was used 
by Edison to stifle competition and maintain his position of power atop the oligopolistic 
motion picture industry.  Finally, the creation of the MPPCo provides an excellent 
example of how multiple firms can pool their resources together in order to effectively 
dominate and structure an industry according to their terms.  Moreover, Edison and the 
members of the MPPCo had access to tremendous capital resources, thereby giving them 
power to dominate the industry.  Edison’s exclusive agreements with Eastman Kodak for 
the film stock to be used in motion picture production and threatening to withholding 
films from exhibitors not in compliance with Edison’s terms are two indicative examples 
of the exclusionary practices that the MPPCo used.  Although the MPPCo was eventually 
dissolved, its patent litigation caused many independent producers to flee to Los Angeles 
where they were able to operate under relative freedom from MPPCo interference.  The 
MPPCo represents the culmination of motion picture industry control through patent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Company, The Lubin Manufacturing Company, The Kalem Company, American Star, American Pathé, and 
the distributor George Kleine. 
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litigation.  The industry would not witness practices similar to those of the MPCCo until 
the introduction of sound. 
The introduction of sound provides another example of powerful corporations 
shaping and controlling the motion picture industry through patent litigation.  Although 
attempts to link sound to motion pictures were undertaken as early as 1889, I will focus 
on the widespread adoption of sound technology standards within the motion picture 
industry.  Specifically, two different methods of wedding sound to motion pictures were 
developed in the early 1920s and each vied for widespread industry adoption: 1) the 
Vitaphone system, a sound-on-disc technology developed by the Warner Brothers film 
studio and controlled by Western Electric, a wholly owned subsidiary of the American 
Telephone and Telegraphy Company (AT&T); and 2) the Photophone system, a sound-
on-film technology developed by General Electric (GE) and its co-owned subsidiary the 
Radio Corporation of America (RCA).5  An additional sound-on-film technology, known 
as Movietone, was developed by Theodor Case and William Fox and was primarily used 
for Fox Movietone newsreels (Gomery, 2005).  The Movietone system was also 
controlled by AT&T’s Western Electric through a sublicensing agreement that allowed 
                                                 
5
 At this point, RCA was a co-owned subsidiary of General Electric and Westinghouse, which, along with 
AT&T, had comprised the main players in the patent pool created by GE at the request of United States 
Navy when the US entered World War I.  All three firms held key patents for manufacturing wireless point-
to-point communication systems.  The resulting Radio-Telephone Patent Pool continued after the war with 
AT&T controlling wired communication (telephony);  GE and Westinghouse controlling wireless 
communication (radio); and all three companies experimenting in radio broadcasting.  RCA was created 
by AT&T, GE and Westinghouse to specifically control the radio stations previously owned by American 
Marconi.  The US Navy had appropriated those stations during the war due to Marconi’s association with 
the British Navy. Because the post-war continuation of the patent pool was illegal, the Anti-Trust Division 
of the Department of Justice investigated General Electric, Westinghouse, and AT&T in the 
1930s.  Ironically, AT&T was simultaneously attempting to claim all of radio for itself.  The upshot was 
complex but included GE and Westinghouse buying out AT&T's share of RCA. 
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AT&T to cross-license its technologies and block competitors from entering the industry.  
Therefore, AT&T’s Western Electric controlled both a sound-on-disc technology and a 
sound-on-film technology, whereas RCA controlled only a sound-on-film technology.  
Consequently, Western Electric’s sound-on-disc Vitaphone system would briefly become 
the industry standard, but RCA continued to use its Photophone sound-on-film system in 
its newly created film corporation, Radio-Keith-Orpheum (RKO).  In what follows, I 
provide a brief description of Photophone and Vitaphone systems, as well as illustrate 
how the corporations controlling these technologies shaped the structure of the motion 
picture industry. 
Warner Brothers was the first American motion picture studio to introduce sound 
films through its Vitaphone format.  The Vitaphone system combined sound with motion 
pictures by using a phonograph disc that accompanied the motion picture.  Warner Bros. 
was a smaller studio in comparison to the other major Hollywood film studios at the time: 
Fox Film Corporation, Paramount Pictures, RKO, and Loew’s Incorporated, owner of the 
Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer (MGM) studio.  However, Warner Bros. was more financially 
aggressive than the larger studios.  When Warner Bros. decided to take a risk on the 
Vitaphone sound system, the studio relied on financial assistance from Goldman Sachs to 
offset the cash-flow problems it was having at the time.6  As a result, the Vitaphone 
Corporation was established, which formally leased the Vitaphone sound system from 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6
 Earlier, historians depicted Warner Bros. near bankruptcy at the time it leased the Vitaphone sound system 
(see Conant, 1960), but later research has shown that the company was experiencing cash-flow problems 
associated with aggressive business practices (see Cook, 1996). 
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AT&T’s Western Electric (Cook, 1996).  AT&T continued to improve the quality of the 
sound-on-disc technology, and the Warner Bros. studio subsequently released the first 
feature-length sound film, The Jazz Singer, in 1927 (Conant, 1960). 
In addition to the sound-on-disc technology developed by Warner Brothers, 
AT&T’s Western Electric also controlled a sound-on-film technology known as 
Movietone, which was developed by William Fox and Theodor Case.  Fox and Case 
attempted to exploit their sound-on-film technology by producing newsreels that would 
accompany motion picture exhibitions.  However, during the early 1920s, the Fox-Case 
Corporation did not have access to the resources needed to achieve such exploitation.  
Consequently, Fox-Case approached GE and RCA to suggest forming an alliance since 
GE had also developed a sound-on-film technology.7  Rather than partner with the 
smaller Fox-Case Corporation, GE and RCA decided to compete with Fox-Case by 
creating RKO Pictures to enter the motion picture industry directly (Gomery, 2005).  Fox-
Case decided to turn over its patents to AT&T’s Western Electric, which could more 
effectively compete with GE and RCA.  As a result, Western Electric held patents for 
both sound-on-disc technology as well as sound-on-film.  Before commenting on the 
extent of Western Electric’s power, I will discuss the development of the Photophone 
sound-on-film system controlled by GE and RCA, which provides the second major form 
of sound film technology. 
When Fox-Case approached GE and RCA to form an alliance, GE had already 
developed a sound-on-film technology known as Photophone.  Sensing the possibility of 
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earning additional profits from its technology, GE gave its patent to its subsidiary RCA in 
order to exploit the technology in the motion picture industry.  However, RCA was 
unable to compete with the powerful position of Western Electric.  When a committee of 
five film studios – Paramount, MGM, Universal, First National, and Producers 
Distributing Corporation – formed in 1927 to determine which sound format would be 
chosen as the industry standard, Western Electric’s Vitaphone system was chosen in favor 
of RCA’s Photophone.  In response, RCA entered the motion picture industry directly by 
creating RKO, which was a fully integrated film corporation (Wasko, 1982).  Although 
RKO would continue to exclusively use RCA Photophone sound reproduction equipment, 
RCA could not compete with the powerful position of AT&T’s Western Electric.     
AT&T’s Western Electric became one of the most powerful corporations in the 
motion picture industry, controlling 90 percent of sound film production through 
Electrical Research Products Incorporated (E.R.P.I.), a licensing division that established 
exclusive agreements with producers (Conant, 1960).  This fact becomes even more 
pronounced when one considers that Western Electric and its parent company, AT&T, 
were previously not involved in the motion picture industry.  However, Western Electric 
became dedicated to exploiting commercial opportunities other than the telephone in 
1926 when it created E.R.P.I.  Therefore, E.R.P.I. was responsible for exploiting multiple 
patent holdings for sound film technology through licensing agreements in the motion 
picture industry.  E.R.P.I. accomplished near complete control of the motion picture 
industry in two ways: by withholding films from theaters not using Western Electric 
                                                                                                                                                 
7
 The Fox-Case sound-on-film technology differed from the GE/RCA technology in that it used a variable 
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sound equipment and by requiring producers to pay royalties on all sound film 
productions.  In this sense, E.R.P.I. engaged in similar exploitative behaviors to those of 
the MPPCo when projection technologies were introduced. 
These case studies demonstrate how two previous technological changes were 
developed and implemented within the motion picture industry due to the decisions made 
by a few key corporations and their subsidiaries.  Despite the differences in historical 
context and the corporations involved, the same economic logic seems to undergird the 
actions taken by the corporations in question.  Those corporations established an 
oligopolistic structure within the motion picture industry during a period of technological 
change.  Moreover, a single corporate entity was able to remain atop the oligopoly by 
exploiting a pool of patents for each technology.  In the case of film projection 
technology, Thomas Edison solidified his position through patent litigation.  When 
Edison and other large firms felt threatened by independent competitors, the large firms 
pooled their patents by creating the MPPCo, thereby consolidating power into a single 
entity that was able to eradicate competition through litigation.  In the case of sound 
technology, two basic formats were developed, but AT&T’s wholly owned subsidiary 
Western Electric was able to successfully exploit multiple patents by establishing 
exclusive licensing agreements with producers through its wholly owned subsidiary, 
E.R.P.I.  Both MPPCo and E.R.P.I. illustrate the extent to which technological change 
can be driven by corporations and their subsidiaries that effectively monopolize industrial 
                                                                                                                                                 
density recording as opposed to the variable area recording used by GE/RCA. 
  
14  
standards.  With these considerations in mind, I will now discuss the objectives guiding 
my research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 
The preceding discussion focused on the corporations that successfully shaped the 
structure of the motion picture industry during periods of technological change.  The 
current transition to digital cinema systems provides a contemporary technological 
change that can be understood in relation to the historical precedent outlined above.  
Accordingly, I identify the firms controlling digital projection technology, including the 
exhibitors that stand to benefit financially from the digital transition.  By identifying the 
latter, I determine the ways in which the film exhibition business is being structured in 
relation to digital cinema.  Specifically, I wanted to know whether any relationships exist 
between corporations that may suggest collusive or monopolistic behaviors similar to 
those of the MPPCo and E.R.P.I.  Ultimately, I use my analysis of the digital transition to 
suggest possible scenarios for the future of film exhibition.   
 
In sum, then, the following research questions guide the research process: 
RQ1: What is the current structure of ownership in film exhibition (i.e., what are 
the largest cinema chains, and how much of the market do these chains 
control)?  
RQ2: Which firms are controlling digital projection technology through joint 
ventures, ad-hoc organizations, or collusion?   
RQ3: Which exhibitors stand to benefit financially from the transition to digital 
cinema and how? 
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To address the research questions outlined above, I conducted document analyses.  
This section will discuss how I employed this method.  I begin by discussing the sample, 
procedure, and measures for my document analysis, including my justification for using 
document analysis.  The first portion of my research focuses on determining the current 
structure of film exhibition, specifically focusing on those entities controlling digital 
projection technology.  I identify the major theater chains in the United States and assess 
their size as measured by number of movie screens as well as the geographic scope and 
location of their theaters.  Having identified these firms, the second portion of my 
research focuses the ways in which certain firms are positioned to benefit financially from 
the transition to digital film exhibition.  Specifically, I discuss how those firms have 
structured their business operations in order to benefit from the digital transition.   
The present study is informed by a critical political economic perspective.  
Critical political economists investigate the power relations underlying the production, 
distribution, and consumption of resources (Mosco, 2009).  The political economic 
perspective stands in opposition to neoclassical economics or, more simply, economics, 
which developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when quantitative 
models were used to explain and predict economic phenomena.  Rather than relying on 
the application of quantitative models or formulae, political economists maintain that 
economics is inherently political because economic decisions are characterized by both 
normative and teleological assumptions (Myrdal, 1971).  Therefore, political economy 
responds to neoclassical economics by stressing the importance of the power relations 
that undergird economic affairs. 
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Traditionally, critical political economists have relied on a counter-hegemonic 
reading of official documents to determine the patterns of ownership and control within 
corporations (Bettig, 2009).  Accordingly, I analyze documents from both primary and 
secondary sources.  Primary documents included government filings, such as 10-K reports 
filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and annual 
corporate reports.  Given the business disclosure requirements in the United States as 
defined by the Securities Act of 1933, I used the SEC filings to determine the ownership 
structures and business operations of major theater chains and their connections, if any, 
with larger corporations conducting business in other areas of the film industry.  In 
addition, the SEC filings also allowed me to determine any strategic partnerships or third-
party agreements the company has negotiated.   
Aside from primary documents filed with the U.S. government, I also relied on 
additional sources.  For example, press releases from corporations, professional 
organizations, or ad hoc entities involved in the transition to digital projection 
technologies provided additional information that supplements official government 
filings.  Finally, trade publications provided reports on film exhibition in the form of 
news, commentary, or officially sanctioned corporate communications.  The disclosures 
made in these secondary sources were compared to disclosures made in the primary 
documents, which yielded additional data concerning the structure and business 
operations of the entities in question.     
Overall, my document analysis was concerned with obtaining qualitative 
disclosures about the ownership structures, business operations, and intellectual property 
rights for the corporations involved in the transition to digital projection technology.  
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Data was culled from a close reading of the documents with special attention given to 
possible sources of bias.  For example, the 10-K filings with the SEC are prepared for 
potential investors and include “forward-looking statements” that may conceal the actual 
state of affairs within the corporation.  Although my document analysis provided me with 
the advantage of a non-reactive approach to research, I remained aware of selective 
deposit and selective survival when analyzing such materials (Webb, Campbell, 
Schwartz, Sechrest, & Grove, 1981).  Selective deposit and selective survival refer to the 
purposive inclusion or exclusion of certain types of data, respectively, and therefore 
caused me to consider the political, social, economic, and cultural context within which 
the documents were created. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
The transition to digital film exhibition in the United States occurs at three 
distinct tiers.  The first two tiers are directly associated with the hardware used in digital 
projection.  Specifically, the first tier includes patent holders for digital projection 
technology.  The second tier involves the corporations that have been granted licenses to 
manufacture digital projectors using patented technology.  Finally, the third tier involves 
the movie theaters in which the digital projectors are installed.  I will begin by discussing 
the first two tiers of the digital transition, including the ad hoc organization responsible 
for developing standards for digital projection.  Having identified the patent holders, 
manufacturers, and standards for digital projection systems, I then discuss the current 
structure of the motion picture theater business in the United States by providing 
quantitative data concerning the number of screens and theater sites for the largest theater 
chains.  According to statistics for the film exhibition business, the top four theater chains 
accounted for 56% of the total box office revenues in 2008 (AMC Entertainment Inc, 
2009).  However, I will focus specifically on the business operations and ownership 
structures of the three largest exhibitors – Regal Cinemas, AMC Entertainment, and 
Cinemark – because these three exhibitors are working together to control the transition 
to digital cinema.  Finally, I discuss the specific ways in which the Big Three are 
controlling digital cinema through joint ventures that exploit business operations outside 
of film exhibition.  
In 2002, six major film studios – Disney, Fox, Paramount, Sony Pictures 
Entertainment, NBC-Universal, and Warner Bros. Studios – formed a coalition known as 
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Digital Cinema Initiatives (DCI), which was created to establish standards and 
specifications for digital cinema.  The DCI specifications established standards for digital 
cinema systems in the following areas: digital cinema system frameworks, digital cinema 
distribution, packaging, compression, transportation, exhibitor or theater specifications, 
projection standards, and security measures.  Although these standards established 
specific guidelines for digital cinema, the standards were broad enough to cover multiple 
digital cinema formats, including differing projection technologies and resolution 
formats.  Currently, however, digital projection technology in the United States is 
dominated by Texas Instruments and Sony.   
Texas Instruments holds the patent for digital light processing (DLP) technology, 
and Sony holds the patent for silicon x-tal reflective display (SXRD) technology.  DLP 
technology was developed in 1987 by Dr. Larry Hornbeck while working at Texas 
Instruments and is currently the most widely used technology for digital projection.  
However, Sony’s SXRD technology is gaining a more significant presence in movie 
theaters because the company is primarily focused on producing higher resolution 
projectors.  Generally speaking, digital projectors are manufactured to project images in 
either 2K or 4K resolution.  Although the cost of 4K projectors has started to decrease, 
the projectors are still more expensive when compared to 2K projectors.  On the other 
hand, 4K projectors offer nearly four times higher resolution than 2K projectors.  With 
such a significant difference in resolution, the industry is moving toward 4K projectors as 
the standard for digital cinema systems.  However, 4K projectors require additional 
hardware to function properly, such as a 4K server that can handle the digital film file 
(Karagosian & Macdowell, 2005).  Because of these additional factors associated with 
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installing 4K systems in theaters, 2K projectors have gained widespread adoption in 
theater chains.  Moreover, Texas Instruments ensured greater use of its DLP technology 
by licensing the technology to independent hardware manufacturers, whereas Sony has 
chosen to use its proprietary SXRD technology solely in Sony projectors.  Table 1.1 
provides a listing of the three corporations granted licenses to manufacture digital 
projectors using Texas Instruments’ DLP technology, including the location of each 
corporation’s headquarters.  In what follows, I offer a brief description of each company’s 
business operations. 
 
Table 1.1  
Licensed Manufacturers of Digital Projectors Using DLP Technology 
Company       Location   
Christie Digital Systems     Kitchener, Ontario 
Barco        Kortrijk, Belgium 
NEC Corporation      Tokyo, Japan 
 
Christie Digital Systems is a privately held company that describes itself as a 
visual solutions company, providing projection technologies for entertainment, business, 
visual environments (i.e., virtual reality), and control rooms (Christie Digital Systems, 
2010).  The second licensed manufacturer is Barco, which describes itself as a global 
technology company that designs and develops visualization solutions for medical 
imaging, media and entertainment, infrastructure and utilities, traffic and transportation, 
defense and security, education and training, and corporate audio-visual needs.  Barco 
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conducts business in more than 90 countries and posted €638 million in 2009 (Barco, 
2010).  Finally, NEC Corporation divides its business operations into six categories: 
information technology (IT) services, IT products, network systems, social infrastructure, 
personal solutions, and electron devices.  For 2009, NEC’s consolidated net sales totaled 
¥4215.6 billion (roughly $46 billion) and the company ranked #727 on Forbes list of the 
world’s 2000 largest companies (NEC Corporation, 2009; Forbes.com, 2010). 
In sum, Texas Instruments and Sony hold patents on the most widely used form of 
digital cinema projection technologies.  While Sony has concentrated on developing and 
manufacturing higher resolution projectors, Texas Instruments has gained widespread 
adoption of its DLP technology because it has been used in 2K projectors.  Furthermore, 
Texas Instruments has granted licenses to Christie, Barco, and NEC for manufacturing 
projectors using DLP technology.  Sony, on the other hand, has focused on producing 4K 
projectors using its proprietary SXRD technology, which offer higher resolution than 2K 
projectors.  As the cost of 4K projectors continues to decrease, more exhibitors may 
choose to install 4K projectors in their theaters.  In this sense, exhibitors will have a 
significant impact on how the transition to digital cinema will progress.  In order to gain a 
better understanding of how digital cinema is controlled at the level of exhibition, I will 
discuss the current process of structuration underway within the film exhibition business 
in the United States. 
The motion picture theater industry in the United States is currently dominated by 
the top three theater chains – Regal Cinemas, AMC Entertainment, and Cinemark 
(collectively referred to as “the Big Three”) – which have consolidated their size and 
power atop the industry through acquisitions and mergers.  Furthermore, the Big Three 
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theater chains are working together to control digital cinema.  Table 1.2 provides a 
quantitative assessment of the concentrated power atop the motion picture theater 
industry and the trend toward consolidation is unlikely to cease any time soon.  In fact, 
AMC Entertainment recently agreed to purchase the Kerasotes Theatres chain, which will 
further consolidate theater ownership in the top three exhibitors.  The merger will result 
in AMC owning the entire Kerasotes Theaters chain with the exception of three 
properties that will be retained by Kerasotes (Kerasotes Theaters, 2010).  To understand 
the ways in which the Big Three are solidifying their position at the top of the motion 
picture theater business, we need to consider the business operations and ownership 
structures of the Big Three exhibitors as well as the specific ways they working together 
to control digital cinema. 
The largest theater chain belongs to Regal Cinemas.8  Regal claims to “operate the 
largest and most geographically diverse theater chain in the United States,” which 
includes the wholly owned subsidiaries of Edwards Theaters, Hoyts Cinemas, and United 
Artists Theater Company chain (Regal Entertainment Group, 2010).  Regal Entertainment 
Group is the ultimate owner of all Regal properties, including the aforementioned wholly 
owned subsidiaries.  The company’s theaters are located solely in the United States where 
the company has a presence in 39 states as well as the District of Columbia.  The highest 
concentration of theaters is located in the state of California where the company owns 97 
theaters.  Furthermore, Regal’s theaters are located in 44 of the top 50 markets in the 
United States, giving the company a significant presence in major urban areas.  
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Table 1.2  
Top Ten Movie Theater Chains in the United States and Canada 
Company     Screens   Sites 
Regal Cinemas    6,778    549 
AMC Entertainment    4,612    307 
Cinemark USA9    3,769    293 
Carmike Cinemas    2,288    250 
Cineplex Entertainment Ltd. Partnership 1,337    132 
Kerasotes Theaters    933    95 
National Amusements    920    67 
Marcus Theaters Corporation   657    52 
Hollywood Theaters    536    49 
Rave Motion Pictures    473    30 
Note. From National Association of Theater Owners (NATO), retrieved March 15, 2010 
from http://www.natoonline.org/statisticscircuit.htm 
The second largest exhibitor is AMC Entertainment, which provides one of the 
more interesting and complex cases for the purposes of this study.  AMC Entertainment is 
owned by Marquee Holdings Inc., which is owned by J.P. Morgan Partners (BHCA) L.C. 
and other funds affiliated with J.P. Morgan Partners and Apollo Investment Fund V, L.P.  
                                                                                                                                                 
8
 Unless otherwise noted, the information for this section has been taken from the 10-K filings for the Big 
Three and their associated companies. 
9
 Note that these figures apply only to Cinemark USA and does not include Cinemark’s international 
theaters.  In total, the Cinemark chain operates 424 theaters with a total of 4,896 screens.   
  
25  
Marquee Holdings Inc. conducts no business operations of its own, but serves strictly as a 
holding company for AMC Entertainment.  The merger of Marquee Holdings into and 
with AMC Entertainment occurred at the end of 2004, and AMC Entertainment 
underwent significant structural transformations beginning in March of 2005.  AMC 
Entertainment began divesting itself of theaters located in foreign markets, such as Japan, 
Hong Kong, Spain, Portugal, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.  In addition, Marquee 
Holdings acquired LCE Holdings Inc., which served as the parent company for the Loews 
Cineplex Entertainment Corporation.  Interestingly, LCE Holdings was formed by 
investment funds associated with Bain Capital Partners, Spectrum Equity Investors, and 
The Carlyle Group, all of which are major private equity firms.  The resulting theater 
chain owned by AMC Entertainment includes the Loews and General Cinema brands, and 
AMC Entertainment now owns theaters in 30 states as well as the District of Columbia in 
the United States.  Similarly to Regal, AMC’s theaters are located in major urban markets 
throughout the United States.  In addition, AMC owns theaters in Canada, France, and the 
United Kingdom as well as a partial interest in two theaters located in Hong Kong.   
The third of the Big Three is Cinemark.  Cinemark owns itself as well as the 
Century Theaters chain.  However, Cinemark is unique from the other two of the Big 
Three in its geographic scope.  Cinemark owns theaters both domestically and 
internationally.  Domestically, the company owns theaters in 39 states with its largest 
presence in the state of Texas where it owns 79 theaters that account for 1,024 screens.  
As opposed to the major urban markets served by Regal and AMC, Cinemark’s domestic 
theaters are primarily located in mid-sized markets.  As a contrast to its domestic theater 
operations, Cinemark owns theaters in major urban Latin American markets, including 
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Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Columbia, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Guatemala.  Most significantly, 72% of Cinemark’s 
international theaters have no direct competition from other theater operators, giving the 
company a monopolistic position within those markets (Cinemark Inc., 2010).   
While each of the Big Three has unique characteristics, the size and scope of their 
operations become staggering when considered as a collective.  The Big Three account 
for nearly 40% of the total screens in the United States, and the inclusion of Cinemark’s 
international theaters provide an additional 130 theaters with 1,066 screens in thirteen 
Latin American countries.10  Furthermore, the Big Three maintain a connection to a major 
financial institution via J.P. Morgan’s ownership of AMC.  The connection to J.P. 
Morgan allowed the Big Three to receive $525 million to aid in the rollout of digital 
cinema projection systems (DiOrio, 2009).  Aside from their access to capital resources, 
however, the Big Three have controlled the transition to digital cinema in other important 
ways.  
The Big Three have pooled their resources to effectively control the transition to 
digital cinema systems through two joint venture operations.  The first joint venture, 
known as Digital Cinema Implementation Partners (DCIP), is an independent corporation 
that secures funding and negotiates agreements with major film studios for the 
implementation of digital cinema systems.  The second joint venture is known as National 
CineMedia (NCM), which serves as an in-theater advertising network and distributor of 
                                                 
10
 According to statistics from the National Association of Theater Owners for 2009, the Big Three account 
for 39.2% of the total indoor screens and 38.6% of the total screens.  When AMC acquires Kerasotes, the 
Big Three will control approximately 41.7% of the total indoor screens and 41% of the total screens. 
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non-feature film content.   In what follows, I discuss these two joint ventures in greater 
detail by focusing on their business operations.   
All business operations of the Big Three related to digital cinema take place 
through DCIP.  Accordingly, each of the Big Three maintains an equal voting interest in 
the company, which was created to finance, procure, and deploy digital cinema projection 
systems.  Primarily, the company negotiates with film studios and financial institutions to 
secure funding for the digital transition.  As producers and distributors of digital films, 
studios will save on costs associated with shipping material film prints to exhibitors.  
Consequently, studios have agreed to pay virtual print fees to exhibitors to offset the 
savings of shipping material film prints.  These virtual print fees will be collected by 
DCIP through its subsidiary Kasima.  In addition, DCIP announced it had secured a total 
of $660 million for the rollout of digital cinema systems, which includes $445 million 
from major financial institutions, such as J.P. Morgan, GE Capital, Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking Corporation, Barclays Bank, Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank, and Citi (Digital Cinema Implementation Partners, 2010).  
Undoubtedly, these financial institutions see digital cinema as a viable investment 
opportunity.11  In addition, DCIP offers to lease digital cinema equipment to other 
exhibitors that negotiate agreements with DCIP.  This provides the Big Three with one 
way to control the diffusion of digital cinema projection technology to competing 
exhibitors.  Since smaller independent or regional theater chains do not have access to the 
types of funding provided to the Big Three via DCIP, those exhibitors may rent digital 
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cinema equipment from DCIP if they are unable to secure independent funding for the 
transition.  While DCIP is primarily focused on the financing and deployment of 
hardware for digital cinema projection, the second joint venture of the Big Three provides 
a means to exploit content-related business operations. 
Through the second joint venture, National CineMedia (NCM), the Big Three 
offer an in-theater advertising network as well as distribution of non-feature film content 
through its subsidiary Fathom Events.  NCM is slightly different from DCIP in its 
ownership structure.  Whereas the Big Three own DCIP equally, they hold differential 
ownership stakes in NCM: Regal owning 25%, AMC owning 18.5%, and Cinemark 
owning 15%, which accounts for a total of 58.5% ownership.  The remaining 41.5% is 
owned by National CineMedia Inc., which serves as a holding company for the operating 
company National CineMedia LLC.  Through the operating company, NCM develops, 
produces, sells, and distributes content that is exhibited via its on-screen pre-feature 
program called FirstLook.  The advertising programs featured in FirstLook primarily 
come from national advertisers, but the NCM network allows local vendors to purchase 
advertising spots within the program cycle.  In this sense, the FirstLook program operates 
in a manner similar to local television broadcasts, whereby local vendors may purchase 
advertising time from the network affiliate but national ads are also featured.  In addition, 
NCM offers advertising programming for display in theater lobbies, thereby immersing 
moviegoers in what might be called pre-show “advertainment.”  The advertising 
                                                                                                                                                 
11
 Consider, for example, the inclusion of GE Capital in this investment group.  GE owns both GE Capital 
and NBC-Universal, which owns Universal Studios. 
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operations of NCM account for 88% of its total revenue, but NCM also distributes non-
feature film content to its network of theaters through its Fathom Events subsidiary. 
Fathom Events markets and distributes alternative content throughout the NCM 
network.  Alternative content, in this sense, refers to non-feature film content, such as live 
and prerecorded special events like contemporary music concerts, theatrical 
performances, and sporting events.  For example, programming recently offered by 
Fathom Events included live performances at the New York Metropolitan Opera, Glenn 
Beck’s The Christmas Sweater: A Return to Redemption, a live concert performance by 
The Black Eyed Peas, a live performance of A Prairie Home Companion, Rifftrax Live, 
the Floyd Mayweather versus Juan Manuel Marquez boxing match, and a screening of the 
documentary Living in Emergency: Stories of Doctors Without Borders, which was 
followed by a live discussion with some of the doctors featured in the documentary.  In 
addition, Fathom Events enables theater space to be used for a variety of other purposes, 
including corporate meetings, training seminars, or religious services.  In order to access 
the events offered by Fathom and the advertising network provided by NCM, exhibitors 
must enter into an exhibitor services agreement (ESA) that grants NCM exclusive rights 
to sell advertising as well as meeting and communication services in their theaters.   
 In sum, the Big Three control the digital transition in two important ways: at the 
level of finance and hardware as well as at the level of digital content.  Through AMC’s 
close ties with J.P. Morgan, the Big Three secured the financing necessary to equip their 
theaters with digital cinema projection technology.  Furthermore, NCM and Fathom 
Events provide advertising revenues and alternative content to theaters owned by the Big 
Three.  Any other exhibitor wishing to benefit from access to the premium alternative 
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content offered by Fathom Events must sign an agreement that grants NCM exclusive 
rights to sell advertising as well as meeting and communication services in their theaters.  
Unless independent or regional exhibitors are able to secure independent financing for the 
implementation of digital cinema projection technologies in their theater chains, they may 
be forced to subscribe to the services offered by the Big Three.  In such a system, 
independent and regional chains may become dependent on the Big Three for access to 
the benefits promised by digital cinema. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
Throughout this thesis, I have shown how corporations have effectively controlled 
periods of technological change.  I began with a discussion of two examples from film 
history, whereby corporations used periods of technological change to solidify their 
position atop the film industry.  Specifically, I focused on the Motion Picture Patents 
Corporation’s (MPPCo) control over film projection technology as well as the control of 
sound technology by Electrical Research Products Incorporated (ERPI), a subsidiary of 
AT&T’s Western Electric.  In each case, corporate control of these technologies reshaped 
the structure of the film industry and ushered in a hierarchy of power, whereby smaller 
firms were forced to comply with user agreements that would grant them access to the 
new technology of the larger firms.  In using these two case studies as an historical 
background, I showed how similar practices are taking place today as film exhibitors 
experience the transition to digital cinema projection technologies.   
I demonstrated how Regal Cinemas, AMC Entertainment, and Cinemark – 
collectively referred to as the Big Three – have combined their resources to control the 
transition to digital cinema through two joint ventures.  On the one hand, the Big Three 
have created DCIP to secure the funding and hardware necessary to equip their theaters 
with digital cinema projectors.  On the other hand, the Big Three have created NCM, 
which serves as an in-theater advertising network as well as a distributor of non-feature 
film content.  Fathom Events, a subsidiary of NCM, specifically focuses its business 
operations on marketing and distributing alternative content that can be exhibited to 
theaters that subscribe to the service.  In order to gain access to NCM’s services, 
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including the alternative content offered by Fathom Events, exhibitors must enter into an 
agreement that would grant NCM exclusive rights to sell advertising as well as meeting 
and communication services within the theaters of its subscribers.   
The two joint venture operations of the Big Three provide an interesting turning 
point for the film exhibition business.  The Big Three have now formally entered into 
business operations that have historically been detached from film exhibition, such as 
distribution operations now being conducted by NCM and Fathom.  This fact becomes 
particularly striking when one considers the historical practice of fully integrated film 
studios providing access to premium first-run feature films only to those theaters owned 
by the studio.12  Historically, this type of business practice led independent exhibitors to 
lobby for antitrust legislation, which eventually came in the form of the Paramount 
Decrees.  This, of course, begs the question as to whether independent theaters or regional 
chains will be adversely affected by the business practices of the Big Three.  For the 
moment, the trend toward greater consolidation within the film exhibition business does 
not seem likely to slow down.  Therefore, the film exhibition business is becoming 
structured according to a distinct hierarchy of power.  The Big Three have firmly 
established oligopolistic control over other regional and independent theater chains.  
Indeed, AMC Entertainment recently announced its acquisition of Kerasotes Theaters, 
one of the largest regional theater chains in the Midwestern United States.  At the time of 
acquisition, Kerasotes was a subscriber to NCM and Fathom Events.  Despite the 
resources provided by NCM and Fathom, Kerasotes did not have access to the same types 
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of funding provided to the Big Three, which raises another important issue when 
considering the digital transition. 
As stated in the introduction to this thesis, one of the primary reasons that the 
transition to digital cinema projection systems was such a slow process was due to a lack 
of funding.  Studios and exhibitors simply could not agree on who ought to be responsible 
for funding the implementation of digital projectors.  The Big Three received an initial 
$525 million to fund the transition within their theaters due to their connection with J.P. 
Morgan.  Subsequently, the Big Three received an additional $660 million with $445 
million coming from J.P. Morgan and other large financial institutions.  These funds were 
handled by the DCIP joint venture.  Access to this type of funding has placed the Big 
Three at a significant advantage compared to independent and regional cinemas.  Without 
the ability to fund the transition to digital cinema projection technology independently, 
smaller theaters have sought alternative means for procuring digital cinema systems.  
Moreover, exhibitors who wish to access the content offered by Fathom are required to 
sign agreements with the Big Three via NCM, thereby providing the Big Three with 
access to advertising revenues within the theaters of their competitors.  In this sense, 
AMC’s purchase of Kerasotes may provide the first example of similar events to occur in 
the future as the new hierarchy of power takes shape in the film exhibition business. 
The Big Three exhibitors received funds from J.P. Morgan and other financial 
institutions but, in order to understand the current fiscal state of film exhibitors, we need 
to consider some historical context.  Theater construction boomed beginning in the late 
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 Studios were vertically integrated in production, distribution, and exhibition as well as horizontally 
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1970s and continued into the 1990s.  Specifically, theaters were being turned into 
multiplexes and megaplexes featuring numerous screens per theater.  Moreover, newly 
constructed theaters were conveniently located in commercial zones with many attached 
to shopping malls.  To reduce initial investment costs associated with theater 
construction, exhibitors chose to lease space from shopping center developers.  By saving 
on construction costs and remaining financially stable during the 1980s, exhibitors 
attracted investment from the financial community (Guback, 1987).  Theater construction 
continued into the 1990s and many older theaters were refurbished to attract consumers to 
a unique viewing experience.  Thus, cup holders, large seat backs, extravagant lobby 
designs, restaurants, and even gourmet food in some cases became part of the standard 
movie-going experience.  Eventually, continued construction and refurbishment during 
the 1990s caused many exhibitors to become overextended financially.  As a result, nine 
of the largest theater chains in the United States filing for chapter eleven bankruptcy 
status in the early 2000s.  When one considers this fact, the increasing consolidation of 
ownership in the film exhibition business is understandable as exhibitors restructured 
their business operations and ownership structures.  The transition to digital cinema 
provides another key moment to restructure the industry along distinct power lines. 
Overall, I have attempted to establish the foundation for a more nuanced political 
economic analysis of film exhibition here by focusing on the current transition to digital 
projection systems.  The transition provides one way to understand the current structure 
of the film exhibition business, as well as the ways in which the Big Three are controlling 
                                                                                                                                                 
integrated in exhibition through the ownership of a theater chain. 
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the digital transition.  Fueled by investment money from J.P. Morgan, the Big Three are 
solidifying their position atop the hierarchy of power in the film exhibition business.  
With access to significant amounts of capital, the Big Three are able to undergo the 
transition to digital cinema systems more quickly than other theater chains.  In addition, 
the Big Three are conducting business operations that will force other theater chains to 
become dependent on their services in order to access exclusive content, such as the New 
York Metropolitan Opera, live sporting events, concerts, and other types of special 
programming.  Therefore, the careful planning and implementation of technological 
change by corporations provides an opportunity to restructure the industry according to 
the terms of those controlling the technology.  While I have contextualized the current 
transition to digital film exhibition within two historical case studies of technological 
change in film exhibition, a more nuanced analysis could focus on other important 
aspects of technological change.  In what follows, I discuss possible areas for additional 
research.  
To begin, a more solid theoretical understanding of digital technologies would 
establish an important conceptual framework that places digital technologies within the 
dialectical relationship between capital and democracy.  I would argue that such a 
framework ought to stress the social aspects of technology rather than purely technical 
characteristics.  Technology and the process of digitization can enable greater access to 
creative or cultural goods but, in order for this to take place, the technology needs to be 
truly participatory.  Otherwise, digital technologies simply further the expansion of 
capital relations.   
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Within the context of digital cinema, digital projection technology has the 
potential to exhibit progressive forms of digital content, including locally produced 
media, non-commercial, avant-garde, alternative, or radical media productions.  If digital 
cinema technology were used for these purposes, then theater chains could provide an 
exhibition outlet for independent media producers working with digital equipment, 
thereby truly democratizing the film industry.  Independent and smaller theater chains 
could also use digital technologies to network with one another in creative ways, which 
would establish a reliable distribution network for independent producers.  However, the 
Big Three have carefully coordinated the transition to digital cinema in order to provide a 
reliable network of theaters for the exhibition of exclusive content, particularly 
Hollywood films in 3-D format.  In this sense, digital film exhibition simply becomes 
another format for recycling and repackaging intellectual property held by the major 
media conglomerates like News Corporation, Time Warner, Disney, National 
Amusements, and General Electric.13   
In order to truly democratize theatrical digital cinema, a reliable theater circuit 
would need to exist for the exhibition of independent content.  However, this begs the 
question as to whether the traditional form of theatrical exhibition remains a viable outlet 
for independent content, especially when online distribution and access provides a much 
easier means to accomplish such a goal.  These are precisely the issues that a more solid 
theoretical understanding would account for as well as undertaking a more broadly based 
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 As of this writing, General Electric and Comcast have preliminarily agreed upon terms to transfer 
ownership of NBC-Universal.  If the deal is consummated, Comcast will assume 51% ownership and 
General Electric will retain 49%. 
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interrogation of the ways in which exhibition and access play an important role in media 
economics. 
Secondly, my case studies have demonstrated how corporations and their 
subsidiaries have carefully orchestrated the process of technological change within film 
exhibition, but each case study occurred within a unique historical context.  For example, 
I briefly discussed how the costs associated with starting a production or exhibition 
company were very inexpensive when film projection technology was first introduced.  
Anyone with access to a camera and space for exhibition could easily enter the film 
industry.  Indeed, Edison faced competition from hundreds of independent producers and 
exhibitors looking to profit from the high demand for filmed entertainment.  This was 
precisely the reason for the formation of the MPPCo.   
By pooling the members’ patents, the MPPCo threatened to sue independent 
producers and exhibitors for infringement upon patented devices and materials.  Rather 
than engaging in a legal battle with Edison and the MPPCo, many producers and 
exhibitors simply chose to shut down their operations.  Those producers and exhibitors 
that wanted to continue operating would need to abide by licensing agreements 
established by the MPPCo.  In this sense, technology that was being used on the periphery 
of the burgeoning film industry became centered in the core, which was comprised of 
powerful corporations looking to exploit the commercial potential of projection 
technology.   
Similarly, the Big Three are concentrating digital projection technology within 
their theater chains and restricting competitor’s access to the technology by requiring 
rival exhibitors to abide by licensing agreements.  Only by agreeing to these licensing 
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agreements can rival exhibitors gain access to the content provided by NCM.  
Consequently, the licensing agreements allow the Big Three to derive revenue from 
advertising sales within rival theaters.  In sum, the process of structuration during times 
of technological change remains the same even though each change occurs within 
different historical contexts.   
Thirdly, I have focused specifically on the digital transition within the United 
States.  The global transition to digital cinema is underway as well.  Neither Regal or 
AMC own theaters outside the United States, but Cinemark owns properties in Latin 
America.  Moreover, we know the Big Three have received substantial amounts of capital 
from J.P. Morgan and other financial institutions to accelerate the rate of implementing 
digital cinema systems.  Further research tracing the ways in which capital, digital 
projection, and digital content is being distributed around the world would provide 
important insights into the global digital transition.  Such research may reveal significant 
interconnections among the corporations controlling and financing the digital transition at 
the national and international levels.   
The establishment of a global digital cinema network will have important 
implications for international film distribution.  Depending on the scope of digital 
integration, we may witness a significant change in the spatial and temporal dynamics of 
film distribution.  For example, digital cinema could make possible the simultaneous 
release of films on a global basis.  Arguably, this could reduce or eliminate piracy.  The 
effectiveness of this tactic, however, is dependent on differing national contexts and the 
results remain to be seen.   
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Fourthly, aside from the spatial and temporal aspects of a global analysis, 
additional research might also concentrate on other areas associated with the digital 
transition, including companies specializing in digital cinema system integration.  I have 
discussed the digital cinema system implementation services provided by DCIP, but 
DCIP is not the only company providing such a service.  The Cinema Buyers Group, 
which is controlled by the National Association of Theater Owners, has contracted 
AccessIT14 as the preferred vendor for digital cinema system installation for its smaller 
and independent member theaters in North America (National Association of Theater 
Owners, 2008).  Aside from AccessIT, Kodak and Technicolor also offer digital cinema 
implementation services and similar firms exist worldwide.  Corporations like these can 
provide an additional area for research that could yield interconnections among those 
corporations, the corporations controlling digital cinema, and global financial institutions.  
The full extent of these interconnections is currently difficult to discern because the 
transition is still underway both domestically and internationally.  As the transition takes 
shape internationally, we will need to interrogate these types of interconnections within 
national contexts while remaining conscious of the global connections as well.   
Fifthly, the types of programming made available through the use of digital film 
prints and digital networks deserves closer attention.  After all, the rhetoric surrounding 
digital cinema focuses on its ability to provide exhibitors with greater choice in the types 
of content shown in their theaters.  I have briefly mentioned a few examples of content 
                                                 
14
 The contract for digital cinema installation was awarded to AccessIT, but the company changed its name 
to Cinedigm Digital Cinema Corporation in 2009.  The company is publicly traded and specializes in 
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exhibited in digital format, but digital cinema systems enable theatrical space to be used 
for many different types of purposes.  If digital film exhibition truly democratizes the film 
industry, then we ought to be able to document creative and alternative uses of digital 
cinema space.  Rather than simply providing space for corporate meetings, recycled film 
texts, or advertainment, digital cinema space can be used to connect citizens around the 
world.  This scenario seems unlikely, however, since it would require Hollywood and the 
Big Three to relinquish a certain amount of control.  On the other hand, independent or 
alternative media producers may choose to license their content to NCM, which would 
give them a substantial theatrical release for their independent content.  A systematic 
examination of the types of programming made available by NCM would determine the 
degree to which such collaboration is possible.             
Finally, further research will also need to address the implications that the digital 
transition will have for laborers working in the film exhibition business, especially 
projectionists.  Projectionists skilled in the assembly of material film prints and 
maintenance of film projectors will face significant challenges.  In fact, skilled 
projectionists may be out of a job altogether as the industry begins to distribute digital 
film prints.  Presently, material film prints are far from obsolete, but the implementation 
of digital cinema systems eliminates the need for skilled projectionists.  Traditionally, 
films have been sent in canisters that contain reels of film stock.  Projectionists then 
splice the film print together as well as the trailers that will precede the feature film.  
Once assembled, the film is placed on a spool and threaded through the projector.  
                                                                                                                                                 
services associated with the transition to digital cinema, such as technology, software, finance, and content 
delivery. 
  
41  
Projectionists are also trained in troubleshooting in case any part of the system 
malfunctions.  At the end of the theatrical run, the film print is disassembled and shipped 
back to the distributor.  Digital film prints, on the other hand, are currently delivered in 
three different ways: via satellite uplink, fiber-optic cables, or by shipping a hard drive 
containing the film.  In each case, the exhibitor simply needs access to a decryption key to 
access the film.  In this sense, accessing digital film prints operates similarly to 
downloading a file to your computer, which eliminates the need for skilled laborers.  
Those projectionists wishing to keep their jobs may find recourse in receiving training for 
digital projector maintenance and operation.  However, the effects of the digital transition 
raise some serious issues regarding the nature of technological change and its effects on 
the labor process.  
The transition to digital film exhibition provides an important and germane 
moment for political economic analysis.  The film exhibition business is becoming 
structured according to a distinct hierarchy of power.  Specifically, the Big Three 
exhibitors in the United States are controlling digital cinema at the levels of finance, 
hardware, and content.  In order to gain access to the services provided by the Big Three, 
exhibitors must surrender rights to sell advertising within their theaters.  Such 
exclusionary business practices are reflective of previous technological change when the 
film industry was restructured according to the terms set by powerful corporations and 
their subsidiaries, such as the MPPCo, General Electric, or AT&T’s Western Electric and 
E.R.P.I.  The fact that the Big Three exhibitors are working together to control digital 
cinema in the United States certainly calls for more research and detailed analysis as the 
digital transition continues in the coming years.  
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The digital transition will have significant consequences for the relationship 
between exhibitors and film studios as well as the studios’ parent companies.  If the 
largest movie theater chains become fully digitized, studios and their ultimate owners will 
further usurp the rulings of the Paramount Decree in 1948 that ordered the divestiture of 
theater operations.  I foresee a more concerted effort to reintegrate movie theaters into 
larger media conglomerates, which Time Warner and National Amusements, owner of 
CBS and Viacom, have already done.  Undoubtedly, the justification for further 
reintegration of theaters would allude to the cornucopia of digital technologies capable of 
providing access to content.  Theatrical exhibition, then, would simply provide one of 
many options for accessing content, and media conglomerates would claim that 
reintegration is a logical step in removing old barriers that inhibit free trade.  To resist 
greater consolidation and control within the particular context of film exhibition, we need 
to understand the underlying logic of the Paramount Decrees, which stressed barriers to 
open competition and exclusionary business practices.  We need to reassert the 
importance of open competition, diversity, and democracy in ever-consolidating media 
industries. 
The transition to digital cinema projection technologies is still an ongoing process 
and the novelty of the film viewing experience promised by digital cinema may not 
continue to entice consumers.  While the Big Three are establishing a network of theater 
space that can be used for new and unique purposes, the vast majority of productions 
shown using digital cinema technology have not substantially altered the movie-going 
experience.  Old films have been recycled in digital or three-dimensional formats, as was 
the case for Disney’s re-release of Toy Story in 3-D.  Audience members pay an 
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additional $3 to $7 for ticket prices when attending special events or three-dimensional 
exhibitions.  Currently, some audiences seem willing to pay the additional cost for the 
aesthetic experience, but I do not expect audiences to continue paying higher ticket 
prices, especially for recycled content.  On the other hand, News Corporation’s Avatar 
was produced specifically to showcase the capabilities of three-dimensional cinema.  
While the film was a success at the box office, the aesthetic novelty of the film needs to 
be kept in perspective.  Avatar was produced specifically for three-dimensional exhibition 
from the first day of production.  By contrast, most films are still produced for two-
dimensional exhibition, but films released by major studios have been converted into 
three-dimensional formats to profit from higher ticket prices.  For example, Time 
Warner’s Clash of the Titans was released in three-dimensional format even though the 
film was not intended for three-dimensional exhibition.      
While we may not yet understand the full implication of the transition to digital 
projection, we can certainly find examples from history that underscore the tendency of 
corporations to control periods of technological change.  Popular rhetoric and corporate 
publicity campaigns tend to emphasize a unique aesthetic experience.  However, we need 
to consider the intersection between aesthetics and economics.  When one considers the 
ownership structures and business operations of media conglomerates, technological 
change simply provides an additional means for exploiting the intellectual properties held 
by those firms.  Within the specific context of the film exhibition business, technological 
change has historically allowed a few corporations to restructure the industry according to 
their terms.  Although technological change can enable increased creativity and greater 
democratization, these ends are not met when digital technologies are controlled by 
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capital and corporate interests.  In this sense, corporate control provides an example of 
continuity throughout periods of technological change. 
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